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21 December 1965

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

REVIEW OF INSURGENCY PROBLEMS

This publication provides a periodic review of internal security in underdeveloped countries where there is a threat from Communist-supported insurgency.

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Office of Current Intelligence

State Department review completed

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
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REVIEW OF INSURGENCY PROBLEMS

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OCI No. 0594/65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
21 December 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Review of Insurgency Problems

1. Thailand

Communist subversives in northeast Thailand may soon be getting outside support for increased activity.

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So far, Communist armed activity in the northeast has been confined to terrorist assassinations. The several skirmishes which have occurred in the northeast this year have resulted from government operations.

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2. British Guiana

It is highly unlikely that a coup will be attempted against the Burnham government in the near future. Most politically minded elements in British Guiana are preoccupied with the colony's coming independence, now scheduled for 26 May 1966. The pro-Communist People's Progressive Party (PPP) has been unable to make up its mind whether to use violent or pacific means to attempt a return to power. Its halfhearted efforts to use violence to delay independence so far have not amounted to much. It is possible that the party may decide to count on the numerical superiority of its East Indian supporters to vote it back into office in the 1968 elections. The PPP may elect to indulge in anti-government demonstrations and to continue its hit-and-run sabotage and arson attacks, but it is unlikely to attempt a major assault, if at all, until after October 1966 when the British troops are scheduled to depart. If the new Guyana Defense Force and the police service do not receive sufficient new recruits and training to enable them to take over from the British, the period after October 1966 could pose a security hazard. The military (both native and British) is solidly behind the regime and is dedicated to its preservation.

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3. Colombia

A full-scale battle began on 17 December between the army's specially trained anti-guerrilla forces and the combined gangs of Communists Tiro Fijo and Ciro Castano. The guerrillas have been forced out of their mountain stronghold of Rio Chiquito and reportedly are fleeing northeastward into the state of Tolima.

About 100 guerrillas are moving through southern Tolima, stealing cattle and food as they go. The district commander has curtailed Christmas leaves for his personnel and established a curfew.

The US ambassador and other embassy officials may be targets of kidnaping attempts between now and 31 January, according to the minister of war. The

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Army of National Liberation (ELN) is planning the kidnappings as well as raids on small towns and a series of bombings, the minister told the ambassador, and may launch a concerted terrorist attack on Christmas Eve. The ELN, formed around a cadre trained in Cuba, has done nothing spectacular since it raided the small village of Simacota on 7 January 1965.

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4. Guatemala

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The Peralta regime has been seriously weakened by general popular dismay over the continuance of Communist terrorism, military criticism of Peralta's indecision in a time of crisis, and outrage over what the politicians view as the regime's intent to rig the March elections.

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Kidnapings--four in less than a month--perpetrated by the Communist Party's action arm and Yon Sosa's Communist-leaning 13 November Movement have proved lucrative to these guerrilla-terrorist organizations, which already have collected \$250,000 in ransom. The inability of security forces to cope with this threat or with sporadic sabotage and assassination of government informants has generated public disquiet. There is widespread and exaggerated suspicion that the government is riddled with Communists.

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5. Peru

The death of another top-ranking leader of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) may spell the end of serious guerrilla activities in Peru, at least for many months. It has been confirmed that Guillermo Lobaton and five other guerrillas were killed in a battle with government forces on 13 December. Lobaton commanded the MIR guerrilla band in central Peru, the MIR's only remaining active unit since army troops decimated its southern organization last October.

The MIR does have a guerrilla band in northern Peru and has also been trying to organize an urban terrorist militia in Lima. Both of these groups, however, have shown little or no capability to conduct insurgent actions.

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Army and civil guard police troops are presently conducting a search operation for suspected guerrilla groups in the Ayacucho area. Army guerrillas in this area probably belong to the Army of National Liberation (ELN), a Cuban-trained group of 30 to 40 who joined the MIR several months ago.

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
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
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
6. Venezuela



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A US country team report of 13 December, which the ambassador regarded on 16 December as still valid, discounted rumors of an imminent military coup that are currently circulating in Caracas. The country team pointed out that the general political and economic situation is such that an attempted coup would probably fail to generate popular support and that the ingredients of an explosive situation are clearly absent.

President Leoni concurred in the embassy's assessment in a conversation with the ambassador on 17 December. He stated there is no real basis for a coup and does not consider there is enough support within the military to start one. He stressed that if one were started it would definitely fail, but the process of defeating it would be "civil war."



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


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